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Abstract 
Contesting crime and ensuring safety have been on the national and local 
political agendas in many European countries for quite some time. Public 
attention shifted more and more to this topic the last years because of rising 
crimes rates, but also because people felt more unsafe, especially in larger 
cities. The evolution of local safety policy can be seen as a collective effort to 
stand up to new challenges in tackling crime and safety issues, restoring public 
confidence in the process.  In our paper we present a framework for the 
comparative analysis of local safety policy. In this framework not only policy 
learning and policy transfer are important, but also the interplay between policy 
development and political and societal dynamics. We illustrate our approach by 
comparing the development of local safety policy in two cities: Antwerp 
(Belgium) and Rotterdam (The Netherlands). 
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1 Introduction 
 
   Providing public safety is one of the core governmental tasks. Governments 
failing to adequately produce public safety are faced with loss of public 
confidence. Providing public safety has become a Herculean task for many a 
government. Crime and unsafety seem to be wicked problems, which are 
impossible to adequately cope with. Simultaneously, pressure from society on 
governments to perform better has grown and is hanging over their heads as an 
electoral sword of Damocles. Increasing safety has dominated the public 
agenda in many countries. Citizens seek safety and demand tough 
governmental action against crime. Interaction between societal demands and 
government’s response is imperative. 
   In this paper we focus on new arrangements aimed at increasing the 
effectiveness and the quality of surfacing local public safety programs. In an 
effort to regain diminished public confidence and to restore lost connections 
between society and governments, a new paradigm comes to existence in the 
way crime and public safety are dealt with. We believe this development is not 
limited to The Netherlands. 
   These expectations have been a starting point for a comparative study on 
local public safety policy of cities in different countries in Western Europe. 
The aim of this research is to analyze the developments of these local policies 
and to gain insight in the factors that underlie success or failure of specific 
policies in order to give recommendations for good practices. We have 
conducted a comparative research in Rotterdam and Antwerp, both 
frontrunners in public safety policy in respectively The Netherlands and 
Belgium (Flanders). This explorative pilot study will be extended to other 
Western European cities. 
   In this paper we first outline the contours of the conceptual frame for our 
research, followed by presentation and analysis of our findings. Finally, in the 
conclusions we discuss the viability of our research frame.  
 
 
2 Conceptual frame 
 
 
From Government to Governance 
 
   Government has traditionally been placed in the centre of societal 
developments and the perils threatening it. In response to this classical 
government paradigm a new steering paradigm emerged which is the so-called 
governance paradigm. The shift from government towards governance implies 
that government is not an entity but a conglomerate of actors, that government 
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is not the sole actor that attempts to influence societal developments, and that 
government interventions are interventions in policy networks, in which power, 
resource dependency, and strategic behaviour are vital elements (Bekkers c.s., 
2007). 
   Central governments rely upon other actors, sectors and other governmental 
layers. Organizations are supposed to self-organize and self-regulate along with 
other organizations, sectors and levels of government, out of which new forms 
of coordinated or collective action may arise (Bekkers c.s., 2007). These shifts 
mark the end of the governmental monopoly on providing public services and 
the Genesis of an era of cooperation.  
 
Assessing changes in policy; the stratification of policy systems 
 
   Paradigms are relatively difficult to change, and take a long time to come 
into existence.  However, not all parts of a paradigm are equally resistant to 
change. Sabatier (1993) refers to policy systems as belief systems that consist 
of three layers; an abstract deep core, a near (policy) core and secondary 
aspects. The deep core consists of fundamental normative positions and values 
that define the personal philosophy that applies to all policy areas. The policy 
core, which is near the deep core, consists of basic strategies for achieving 
normative positions of the deep core. Converting the core is far from easy, but 
surfacing anomalies will aid that process. Secondary aspects comprise a 
multitude of instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to 
implement the policy core. Since these are specific to a certain policy area they 
are relatively easy to alter. The three layers are hierarchical, from more abstract 
to more specific, with a decreasing resistance to change.   
 
First-second and third order policy changes 
 
   Sabatier’s distinction in different layers in policy systems resembles Hall’s 
(1993) distinction in first, second and third order changes in policy systems. 
First order changes are marginal and display an incremental nature: that is, 
instrument levels are set within existing policies and with existing instruments. 
These changes are frequent and hardly visible. Second order changes are 
adjustments of settings and instruments, within existing policies and are 
usually rather visible. First and second order changes cohere with normal 
policy making, that is, more or less incremental routinized decision making. In 
contrast, third order changes are exceptional, very influential, and disjunctive. 
They refer to shifting policy paradigms. Shifting policy paradigms correlate 
with ideas and standards with regards to instruments, goals and overall terms of 
a program, and the way of explaining the world. First and second order 
changes do not automatically lead to third order changes. 
   Sabatier and Hall both assume that anomalies will occur once a policy system 
ceases to be in sync with reality. At first, first order changes will be brought 
about in the shallow part of the policy system (or secondary aspects). When 
performance keeps falling back, the authority of the existing policy system 
comes into question and other policy systems come within reach. Serious 
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performance crises can eventually trigger paradigm changes. The paradigm 
shifts are likely to involve the accumulation of anomalies, experimentation 
with new forms of policy, and policy failures that initiate competition between 
alternative policy systems that offer better solutions (Hall, 1993). 
   Hall argues that policy change coheres with both learning and powering 
(sufficient political power to bring about significant policy changes, a new 
political coalition). In his view, long-term incremental policy development is 
alternated with short-term sudden periods in which strategic change of a 
paradigm takes place. 
   Sabatier focuses on policy subsystems and internal dynamics within a 
subsystem and perturbations in the broader political system and socioeconomic 
environment. The latter are necessary for changes in the core of a policy within 
the subsystem. With regard to the internal dynamics the so-called Advocacy 
Coalitions Frameworks of Sabatier are important, as vehicles for policy 
changes. Members of such a coalition seek improved understanding of the 
world in order to further the policy objects.  In addition to this, system wide 
coalitions and changes in socioeconomic conditions in a fluctuating world are 
important. The Advocacy Coalition framework is based on the premise that 
policy oriented learning is important for policy change, but changes in the core 
aspects of the policy are the result of perturbations in the non-cognitive 
external factors, such as macroeconomic conditions with the rise of new 
governing coalitions. Policy change results from advocacy coalitions’ attempts 
to translate the policy core and secondary aspects of their belief systems into 
policy programs.  
 
Policy dynamics; explaining the interaction between policy, society and 
politics 
 
   Policy changes do not occur in a vacuum. Interaction between policy, politics 
and society determines to a large extent the rhythm and the appearance of 
policy shifts. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) attempt to explain these dynamics 
in their punctuated equilibrium theory, in which processes of agenda setting 
and issue (re)definition are key issues.  
   Empirically, policy systems are continually being created and destroyed. 
Periods of incremental change are often a prelude for accelerated changes. In 
periods of continuity, policy is entrusted to experts operating within closed 
networks, unnoticed by the public eye. Policy monopolies are important in 
periods of policy stability. Policy monopolies reflect a monopoly on a certain 
kind of ‘understanding concerning the policy of interest, and an institutional 
arrangement that reinforces that understanding.’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993: 6) Issues are defined within a technocratic, non-political framework, 
making debate unnecessary. Experts claim the monopoly on expertise with 
regards to a certain field of policy; the questions to be decided are complex 
technical matters with marginal social impact. 
   The destruction of the policy monopoly coincides with a change in intensities 
of interest, affecting people, political leaders, government agencies and private 
institutions. Contending images arise and policy monopolies can weaken or 
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even disintegrate, because other people become involved, with their own 
interests. In politics, political actors can highlight new or previously under-
lighted dimensions of problems. When new attributes become significant, i.e. 
issues are redefined, more substantial change is possible.  
   Issue definitions are brought in by policy entrepreneurs seeking certain goals, 
who raise public attention by new issue definitions (framing) or by redefining 
old issues (reframing). Issue change tends to occur in periods of high general 
attention to policy. In these periods issues are subject of a broad debate outside 
the experts’ networks, both in politics and society. 
   The degree of public indifference decreases when agendas are set. Issues tend 
to be low on the public and media agenda during periods of stability, but high 
in other periods. That is, in agenda setting partial equilibriums in politics can 
be disturbed (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). If an issue is out in the open 
because it receives ample attention, it also becomes a partisan issue between 
political parties and it is no longer left to experts in policy subsystems. The 
issues change from micro into macro politics. In periods of heightened 
attention new participants appear on the scene because of new policy 
proposals.  
 
Policy learning, policy transfer and the spread of policies 
 
   Policy development requires collective learning – policy learning – although 
other factors are considered equally, if not more, important. Hall (1993: 269) 
defines policy learning as ‘a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques 
of policy in response to past experience and new information.’ However, 
policy learning can also arise from drawing lessons from elsewhere, other 
countries or other policy fields, in a quest for readymade solutions for wicked 
policy problems. Newmark (2002) describes drawing lessons as forms of 
policy transfer, in which conscious external knowledge of policies, programs, 
and ideas are applied in domestic policy development. Policy diffusion, 
contrary to policy transfer, denotes the spread of policies from one 
governmental entity to another where structural and modernizing factors 
account for policy adoption, for example organizational, geographical and 
internal determinant factors (Newmark, 2002). 
 
In short 
 
   In our comparative analysis of the development of local public safety policy 
we focus upon: 
 Shifts in policy content that may have occurred in time; do we see, as we 
expect, shifts from government to governance, a paradigmatic transition? 
 The nature of these changes: first, second or third order changes;  
 The role of policy learning, policy transfer and policy diffusion; 
 Shifts in policy instruments in different cities that occur in time and 
similarities and differences in the deployment of policy instruments ; 
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 The interaction between policy development, politics and (local) society,  
in particular to the role of policy entrepreneurs and issue (re) definition in 
agenda setting; 
 Convergence or divergence in public safety policies of Antwerp and 
Rotterdam. 
 
 
3 Policy development in Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
 
 
National thinking about safety 
 
   The orthodox approach focuses on the use of repressive means by police and 
justice systems. In 1985 the Ministry of Justice drew up a policy document 
called Society and Crime. This document is often considered a watershed in 
thinking about local safety. This document sketched the contours of an 
integrated approach of crime and safety, a key characteristic of Dutch safety 
policy. In subsequent years the national government facilitated local 
governments to develop their own local integrated public safety policy. The 
first policy documents contained a new vision on crime and safety. Later on, 
especially in the early nineties, the focus was more on implementation of 
public safety policy, and the national government designed strategies that were 
copied from the large cities in The Netherlands, which were the first cities to 
be confronted with an increase in and change of crime.  Recent years show a 
significant shift in the national government’s role, especially the Ministry of 
Interior Affairs and Kingdom relations: the national government adapted a 
steering role.  
 
Rotterdam  
 
   Marks and Van Sluis (2007) have analyzed the shifts that have taken place in 
the evolution of safety policy in Rotterdam. The following periods can be 
distinguished: 
   1980-1993 – Until 1993 the traditional repressive approach is dominant. In 
the eighties the first projects aimed at fighting vandalism are started.  
   1994-1998 – In contrast to the preceding period, characterized as contingency 
oriented, this period has a more programmatic approach towards safety. 
Partners at municipal district level, i.e. municipal government, police and local 
justice department, formulated district safety plans based on the so-called 
RISC-model, which helped identify the safety problems that had to be tackled. 
Project managers at city level and in the municipal districts were appointed to 
implement the program. Ergo, a bottom-up approach combined with intensified 
administrative steering at city level.  
   1999-2002 – The national government published the first integrated safety 
program in 1999 (BZK 1999). This and a widespread societal and political 
demand for policy change triggered Rotterdam’s government to formulate its 
own integrated public safety program. In 2001 the mayor initiated a conference 
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to remould Rotterdam’s safety policy and provide ample safety for all 
districts, within the framework of a five-year program. Based on a 
programmatic and integrated approach to public safety issues, significant and 
concrete results were imperative to restore public confidence. 
   Among the program’s key elements is implementation and execution at the 
lowest performable level, i.e. in the sixty-two district levels. A special 
alderman for safety was appointed at city level. Together with the mayor, the 
chief public prosecutor and the chief of policy, he was part of the Steering 
Committee on Safety (SCS), responsible for directing this safety program. The 
SCS decentralized the direct governance over the implementation and 
execution of the five-year program to a new Safety Program Office (SPO). The 
SPO ensures that execution at the (municipal) district level matches city policy. 
The five-year program is a guideline for the SPO in the implementation of 
public safety policy and the formulation of district safety plans together with 
the municipal districts (AEF, 2002). District safety plans are analytical and 
practical guidelines for apt problem solving. These plans were checked at city 
level for their feasibility. Given that city level approval was a prerequisite for 
granting city funds, feasibility was pre-checked.  
   2002-2006 – Liveable Rotterdam, a political party founded in 2001 by late 
Pim Fortyun, set fighting crime and ensuring safety high on the political 
agenda. Following 2002’s election, Liveable Rotterdam became the largest 
party in the city council. Meanwhile, public safety gained significance on many 
a party program. The new city executive board, in which Liveable Rotterdam 
participated, fine-tuned, intensified and extended the Rotterdam integrated 
public safety program (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002), characterized by the 
variety of policy instruments deployed; a mix of area-oriented and individual-
oriented measures, aimed at for example criminal drug addicts. Records were 
made of each person, including their history, and offered a conditional way out. 
Prison sentence followed if they relapsed into their old behaviour. In the area-
oriented approach interdisciplinary intervention teams are deployed to check 
up on illegal habitation and other offences. Supervision on streets has been 
introduced in some areas. Also the city mariner is introduced; a high ranking 
civil servant with authority to command municipal departments in problematic 
districts. He serves as a kind of crisis manager to resolve acute problems on so-
called hot spots: areas experiencing serious problems.  
   The biannual Safety Index (between 1 and 10) shows how safe or unsafe a 
district and the city as a whole has become and classifies them into 5 categories 
and is used to evaluate the five year plan at city and district level.  
   Another hallmark of Rotterdam’s approach is the application of performance 
steering and results-based agreements. Municipal districts for example must 
meet certain concrete targets, although they have significant freedom in 
implementing their own safety program. The format for these plans is 
obligatory for each municipal district, however. Contract management, 
transparency and measurable targets provide stimuli for a better performance.  
   2006-2009 – In 2006 a new municipal executive board has been formed 
without Liveable Rotterdam and with the Social-Democratic Party. The five-
year safety program is incrementally adjusted and improved. New elements are 
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the fight against terrorist threats, radicalism and extremism. SPO’s position 
was strengthened by its transformation into a new municipal Directorate for 
Safety. 
 
 
4 Policy development in Antwerp, Belgium 
 
 
Flanders 
 
   A closer look at the development of national policy with regard to local 
safety in Flanders shows a similar, but delayed pattern. In Flanders, the first 
initiatives of the federal governments coincide with initiatives in the leading 
cities of Mechelen and Antwerp. The first draft of a national policy frame for 
an integrated local approach of crime and safety is published years later than in 
The Netherlands. In 2004 the Flemish government publishes a federal 
document on integrated safety (Kadernota IV, 2004). Concrete national 
priorities are set for the first time. These priorities have to be worked out in 
integrated local safety programs, which only get funded when they match the 
federal priorities. At the federal level, integrated safety policy and the federal 
policy plan for the police are adjusted. Projects targeting specific local 
problems receive funding through for instance the federal Large City Policy. In 
Flanders steering of local safety at the national level has been intensified. 
There has been policy development at the national level into the direction of a 
more integrated approach.  
 
Antwerp 
 
   Compared to Rotterdam, Antwerp -frontrunner in Flanders- lagged behind in 
formulating local safety policy. In a 2004 policy document (Stadsplan Veilig, 
2004) the former safety policy is reviewed, leading to the conclusion that local 
safety policy was aimed at an integrated approach at all levels, but was too 
ambitious in tackling too many problems simultaneously. Coordinating and 
directing all these projects adequately failed in the absence of a shared vision 
by relevant actors.  
   Since 2003 a new direction has been chosen. A new vision was formulated, 
indicating concrete priorities and spearheads. Steering became the main 
challenge for local government, that is, to point the direction, to indicate the 
targets and to facilitate proper implementation. Each actor has his own tasks 
and responsibilities and is accountable for proper performance of his tasks. The 
city opted for a dual track: an area-oriented approach and a persons-oriented 
approach. In problem areas (hot spots) neighbourhood directors were appointed 
to coordinate activities of other agencies involved in improving liveability in 
the area. Minor second offenders, drug addicts, and problem families were 
targeted with the so-called hotshots approach. 
   This new direction was supported through the establishment of a new 
administrative unit, the Unit of Integrated Safety, under the command of the 
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newly created aldermanship for safety. This unit was an important vehicle for 
the implementation of citywide programs like the hotspots and hotshots 
approach. 
 
 
5 Analysis 
 
 
Paradigm changes 
 
   In both Rotterdam and Antwerp, or rather The Netherlands and Flanders, we 
see a gradual but paradigmatic change from a traditional approach of safety to 
a more modern approach. This is a third order change because it touches upon 
the hard core of existing policy systems. In this new paradigm, fighting crime 
and providing safety requires a broad approach in which repression and 
prevention are integrated and the police are considered a last resort. Providing 
safety has increasingly become co-production in partnerships between public 
and private actors and between agencies and citizens. Also a belief exists that 
to produce public safety the commitment of citizens and organization is 
indispensable (see Newburn, 2003). 
 
National and local developments 
 
   The interaction between policy development at national level and local level 
has been rather complex in both The Netherlands and in Flanders. Occasionally 
local policy development took the lead, while at other times it lagged behind 
national policy development. New policies have often been developed in big 
cities, often the first to be confronted with emerging safety problems. 
   Altogether, in both The Netherlands and Flanders we see a shift from safety 
government to safety governance. At the national level we observe a change 
from unconditional (financial) facilitating local governments in dealing with 
societal perils such as crime and safety, towards obligatory contracts. That is, 
top-down steering has been intensified. In this respect, both countries 
converge. However, in The Netherlands this strategy is accompanied by a 
facilitating strategy, which includes providing know-how and supporting 
research to local governments. Also public and private police together with 
other agencies and citizens tackle crime and safety in loosely coupled networks 
and alliances. Network steering is an important part of this approach. Networks 
are created to solve problems like disturbances of the peace, troubles around 
pubs or juvenile delinquency. In these networks, a prime role is reserved for 
the local government. The local government’s role changes into a more 
indirect, facilitating or directing one, sometimes referred to as governance-at-a 
distance (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven, 2004). 
   The transition into this new paradigm took place during the last decade of the 
previous century as a kind of silent revolution, that is, out of the public eye, as 
a product of discussions in rather closed networks of professionals and policy 
makers. Policy learning played an important role. This development took place 
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in both The Netherlands and Flanders, but the Dutch development preceded 
the Flemish one. In this respect policy transfer has occurred. Antwerp copied 
existing policies from Rotterdam, but allowed for alterations, and was inspired 
by other examples like the UK (see Newmark, 2002). 
  
Incremental policy learning and policy acceleration 
 
   The way local safety policy has evolved in the two cities is by no means 
linear or incremental. After the introduction of an integrated approach the 
policy development in Rotterdam has been of a rather incremental nature, 
based on learning from past experience. However, around the turn of the 
century there has been a short period of rapid policy change, induced by the 
appearance of policy entrepreneurs who changed the political agenda. Liveable 
Rotterdam’s redefinition of safety generated much support for a sharpened 
focus on concretely applicable and measurable results and for more 
accountability of city magistrates. Due to the electoral success of Liveable 
Rotterdam at the municipal elections of 2002, resulting in a shift in the political 
power relations, a window of opportunity for significant change emerged. 
Noteworthy is the role played by Rotterdam’s mayor as a policy entrepreneur. 
Taking advantage of the momentum in which safety spearheaded the public 
agenda, he introduced a more long-term programmatic approach to local safety. 
Besides his political leadership, and the support of the chief public prosecutor 
and the chief of police, the managerial leadership of the SPO was an important 
factor underlying the turn local safety policy took. 
   Contrary to the public’s perception, the change in the Rotterdam safety 
policy was less drastic and could be better classified as a second order change. 
That is, during this period the focus shifted towards implementation and 
results: the policy was strengthened. As the Rekenkamer Rotterdam (2005) puts 
it: there has been a lot of continuation in Rotterdam. Even though during this 
period rhetoric and symbolism played a significant role, the real paradigmatic 
change took place the decade before. 
 
Policy entrepreneurs: Political leadership and managerial power 
 
   Antwerp’s mayor revealed himself as a dedicated policy entrepreneur and 
played a crucial role in the shift of safety policy. In Antwerp the political 
agenda on safety has been dominated by the Vlaams Belang (a nationalistic 
party). But through his charisma the mayor of Antwerp has been an important 
factor in bringing Vlaams Belang’s electoral march forward to a virtual 
standstill by redefining the public safety issue and taking over the lead in 
agenda-setting. Safety policies did change but without Vlaams Belang being 
represented in the city council, due to the Cordon Sanitaire. However, their 
points of view were integrated in the political programs of other parties, 
bolstering sufficient political support for the change in public safety policies. 
Mayor Patrick Jansen’s ambition is to keep people together, which is in line 
with the approach of the mayor of Amsterdam. He considers this more 
important than a good performance based on hard figures. The safety policy in 
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Antwerp has been implemented by the Unit of Integrated Safety, under the 
command of the alderman for safety, and since the position’s termination, 
under the mayor’s command. This unit became the central axis in the 
implementation of safety policy, like the SPO has been in Rotterdam. Again, in 
Antwerp, the change in safety policy was buoyed by a combination of 
(charismatic) political leadership, managerial power at the administrative level 
and (political and social) momentum. 
   In Antwerp the change in policy has been initiated because of the 
disappointing result with the former integrated approach that proved to be 
over-ambitious and ineffective, in combination with too little steering by the 
local government (Bruggeman, 2006). Also the rise of public safety on the 
political agenda was a stimulus. Citizens demanded a better performance and 
stronger steering of local government. More specific and concrete targets were 
set, based on a selection of spearheads in policy. The new policy has fewer 
pretensions and is more pragmatic with regard to results and revenues, aimed at 
strengthening the local government’s steering role, effectively heralding the 
end of the era in which safety policy was too unconditional and dominated by 
private initiatives. 
 
Intensified steering capacity of local government  
 
   In both cities we see an urge for strengthening the steering role of local 
government. However, in Rotterdam this development was paralleled with an 
urge to executive safety policy as a business with a sharp focus on results, 
based on result based agreements, monitored by the Safety Index. In Antwerp 
this businesslike approach is rejected, because of fear of perverse effects (see 
De Bruijn, 2001). 
   Both cities implemented a similar mix of policy instruments, consisting of 
preventive and repressive means, a combination of area-oriented and persons-
oriented approaches and a mix of central and decentralized policy instruments. 
Both cities aim at cohesion in the instruments they use. But in Antwerp the 
repressive and zero-tolerance oriented approach, typical for Rotterdam, is 
rejected. An important difference between the two cities is the deployment of 
the city mariner, who has no equivalent in Antwerp, where only neighbourhood 
directors are active. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
   The evolution of local safety policy can be seen as a collective effort to stand 
up to new challenges in tackling crime and safety issues, restoring public 
confidence in the process. By means of our research frame we can interpret the 
development of local safety policy as a rational enterprise, a learning process, 
in which the actors involved learn from mistakes in the past and from 
experience. In this perspective policy learning, policy transfer and the drawing 
of lessons locally and nationally but also across borders, are important.  
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   Nonetheless, our research frame sheds lights on other dimensions of policy 
development and policy change as well. It helps us recognize the phenomenon 
of policy change and to differentiate various types of changes, some of which 
are paradigmatic, touching upon core elements of policy systems. This type of 
change is rather exceptional. Paradigmatic changes cohere with macro 
developments like the changing role of government over time, long-term 
changes in citizens’ preferences and rising expectations about the level of 
societal safety and governmental options. Also the rise and changed nature of 
crime plays an important role. On the other hand, seemingly paradigmatic 
changes can effectively demonstrate a second order nature, touching merely 
upon the instruments being deployed.   
   Political dynamics, agenda-setting processes, and the appearance of policy 
entrepreneurs who define or redefine safety issues add to the unpredictability 
and unsteadiness of policy processes and cause sudden accelerations.  The 
importance of political leadership in combination with managerial stamina in 
the local administration has been demonstrated.  
   As an outcome, safety policy can take different directions and subsequently 
converge or diverge. In the cases we have studied, we see differences as well as 
similarities. On the whole, convergence seems to have the upper hand. This is 
not a priori the case, but the possible convergence of divergence has to be 
empirically established. 
   Finally, our case studies illustrate the necessity of studying the dynamics of 
policy development in relation to its societal and political context. A similar 
statement can be made about studying success or failure of policies. A question 
still to be answered is whether our research frame enables us to adequately 
assess success of failure of local safety policies.   
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